The majority opinion is notable for its reliance on the evidentiary record assembled by Congress and BCRA's defendants and its refreshingly pragmatic view of money and politics. That record painted a vivid portrait of a campaign finance law gamed by political actors beyond recognition to the detriment of the integrity of the political process. The Thompson Committee report provided a particularly rich lode of evidence for the Court. Much of that record was not even challenged by the dissenting justices. For example, the Chief Justice acknowledged that party soft money was created by a series of administrative rulings by the Federal Election Commission. And all of the justices appeared to accept as obviously true a point sharply contested by the plaintiffsthat issue ads broadcast near an election are designed to elect or defeat candidates.
Given the willingness of the Court to strike down congressional enactments in recent years, the deference to Congress expressed throughout the majority opinion is striking. The Court acknowledged "that in its lengthy deliberations leading to the enactment of BCRA, Congress properly relied on the recognition of its authority contained in Buckley and its progeny."
1 Critics see the Court as failing in its responsibility to hold Congress to a high constitutional standard, particularly insofar as BCRA might be construed to abridge First Amendment freedoms. We see a Court
properly recognizing the limited and necessary steps taken by Congress to address a welldocumented set of problems in campaign finance and intelligently clarifying the constitutional space within which it may do so.
As political scientists rather than lawyers, we may insufficiently appreciate the doctrinal challenges being raised against the Court's decision. But in considering four crucial elements of the decision, we find the Court's reasoning persuasive.
The first concerns the meaning of the governmental interest in preventing the actual or apparent corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. In his dissent
Justice Kennedy argued forcefully that Buckley established that Congress' regulatory interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption inherent in contributions made directly to or at the behest of federal officeholders or candidates.
The majority asserted that the Court in Buckley and its progeny had not limited that interest to the elimination of cash-for-votes exchanges (classic bribery already covered by criminal statutes) but instead recognized the broader threat of corruption from constitutional standing. Regulation of any political speech without express words of advocacy of election or defeat, they asserted, would violate First Amendment guarantees.
The Court wisely rejected that argument by demonstrating how "a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the express advocacy limitation, in both the expenditure and the disclosure contexts, was the product of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional command." 4 And it affirmed that Congress had every right to construct an alternative standard that did not suffer from problems of vagueness and overbreadth.
In a third critical finding, the Court found that BCRA's definition of electioneering communications comfortably met that test. The majority saw no need to enter the methodological debate in the record over the proper way to measure the precise The position embraced by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist is a recipe for regulatory disaster. It would extend and perpetuate a system that pretends to limit contributions in federal elections but in reality does no such thing. It would render utterly ineffective the effort by Congress to deal with the well-documented abuses of the FECA regime. By endorsing a regulatory approach that would be openly and routinely flouted by political actors, the Kennedy-Rehnquist alternative would encourage public cynicism and risk a further loss of legitimacy for American democracy.
As welcome as the Court's decision is to us, we don't pretend to know precisely how BCRA will play out in the real world of elections. It will be fascinating to see how political actors adapt to the new rules. But we are struck by how quickly BCRA critics, having lost the argument in the Congress and the courts, are now heralding a parade of horribles that will inevitably follow.
Of course, there is some genuine unease about whether BCRA's balance between speech and political regulation is the appropriate one. But many critics, in our view, are escalating the rhetoric to discredit any future reforms --from changes in the presidential financing system to reforms of broadcast availability and resources to a restructuring of the Federal Election Commission -and to lay the groundwork for an eventual move to repeal BCRA.
Throughout the year-plus since BCRA has taken effect, and especially since the Supreme Court's decision, critics, allied with political reporters who are generally cynical about any institutional reform and with the political consultants who were the conduits for and recipients of much of the soft money in the pre-BCRA era, have pursued a series of themes perpetuating myths about the law and its impact.
Ironically, the two themes that have under girded much of the message are to some considerable degree contradictory. On the one hand, this law is "in its own way, as 
Reality:
The parties were actually weakened in the soft money era by becoming funding conduits for otherwise large illegal contributions; by concentrating resources in a handful of competitive races while shirking investments to broaden their competitive position in others; and by neglecting their small donors in favor of huge soft money contributors. The large amount of soft money going to the parties was illusory; it largely went right out the door into "issue ads" for and against federal candidates, except for the healthy cut taken by campaign lawyers and consultants, with relatively little going to party-building or grassroots activities.
12 According to National Public Radio's All Things Considered, "DeLay's fund-raising staff has created a new entity called Celebrations For Children Incorporated. This new non-profit group, founded just this past September, drew criticism for its very first act, releasing a brochure on fund-raising events to be held in conjunction with the Republican National Convention this coming summer." (NPR, January 6, 2004 .) The brochure, reminiscent of past fundraising appeals from congressional campaign committees, offered different levels of access to DeLay and other prominent Republican officeholders for a sliding scale of large contributions to his charity. Democracy 21 and other reform organizations challenged this appeal as a violation of tax and campaign finance laws. The total hard money raised by the DNC in 2003, $42 million, is more than fifty percent higher than the hard dollars raised in the comparable year 1999, and nearly as much as the total, hard and soft, raised that year-one in which the Democrats controlled the White House! Moreover, the Democratic Party has created a sophisticated set of programs to expand its small donor base, and built a centralized voter-contact and fundraising system (called "Demzilla") to expand the donor base among those able to give the maximum. In the process, the DNC increased its direct mail donors from 400,000 to more than 1 million, and raised almost $32 million in small donations, an 85 percent increase over the On the surface, the Democrats' congressional campaign committees are being significantly out raised by their Republican counterparts. But a deeper look shows a much more competitive scene; Congressional Republicans rely much more heavily than their Democrats' counterparts on direct mail fundraising, which is extremely expensive.
Take out the fundraising costs and look at cash on hand, and the numbers are very different. Because the Internet is nearly costless as a fundraising tool, it has the potential for Democrats to develop and exploit funding from a vast new base of donors.
In sum, both parties will be in a financial position to play on a larger field of House and Senate races and to increase their grass roots mobilization efforts. Indeed, 2004 is shaping up as an election in which a premium is put on voter identification and mobilization.
While independent groups, including the so-called "527s," are active and operating (as the name suggests and the law requires) independently of the parties, much of the effort on the part of liberal groups like Americans Coming Together and the Partnership for America's Families is also directed at voter mobilization and get-out-the vote efforts, which is less a challenge to the parties or a mechanism that will undermine them than a complementary set of activities to engage more Americans politically.
Moreover, a clearheaded look shows that the amount these groups actually have raised is far behind what the parties have accomplished. Finally, serious legal questions exist about the ability of these groups -specifically political committees whose avowed purpose is to influence federal elections -to accept "soft-money" contributions.
As for corporations, anecdotal evidence suggests that much of their soft money appears destined to stay in corporate treasuries. Corporate officials we have talked to say that their soft money donations were often coerced or given as access insurance to counter their rivals. They show no signs of a burning desire to give the money to independent groups; most seem delighted to keep it in their corporate coffers. To be sure, many corporations are now turning their efforts to expanding their executives' involvement in political action committees-an expansion of individual participation in politics through a common interest, which we, along with most reformers, consider legitimate and in no way either an unintended consequence or pernicious effect of reform.
Myth #3:
The law is an incumbent-protection act that will further damage challengers. Said James Bopp, general counsel at the James Madison Center for Free Speech, the law "is an orgy of incumbent protection." 
